Commentary 01 on
Karl Jaspers Forum, Target Article 2, 17 July 1997
A METHODOLOGY FOR THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS?
by Gary Schouborg
THE SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SCIENCE
by Paul Jones
12 August 1997
Abstract
Gary Schouborg's article is an excellent introduction to the
methodology of consciousness studies, stressing the importance
of materialism, dialectics and human activity for true
understanding of consciousness-related phenomena.
Despite of a few minor drawbacks, it may be considered one
of the most consistent approaches available for today.
|
Notation:
[ ] references and notes,
{ } paragraphs of the source text
"The exploration of any new field is necessarily bound to the search for
and development of the appropriate method. It might be formulated as
a general thought that every radically new approach to a scientific
problem necessarily implies the elaboration of the new techniques and
new ways of investigation. The object and method of study are hence
highly interrelated."
"The work on the problem and the development of the method goes on
either in parallel or at least in a common direction. The specification of
the method becomes one of the most important tasks of research. Here,
the method comes as both a precondition and a product, a tool and
a result of the study." [1, ch.2]
I have quoted these two passages from L.Vygotsky to express my
solidarity with Gary Schouborg's approach seeking for the general
foundations of consciousness studies without restricting them to
one of the narrow theoretical paradigms advocated in the contemporary
science split into a handful of fighting with each other and equally
abstract schools.
The first evident merits of the article reviewed are:
- the awareness of the possibility of a centralized study of
consciousness by a special science;
- the realization of the necessity for this science to comply with
the general norms of scientific inquiry;
- the attention to the methodological basis of science in general
and "science of consciousness (SOC)" in the first place.
Since consciousness is a many-level phenomenon, SOC can only
coordinate the efforts of different sciences related to conscious
phenomena, being in this sense interdisciplinary. It need not prescribe
other sciences how they ought to deal with consciousness within their
own inquiry; however, it must bring the diverse data on various
aspects of consciousness coming from other sciences under a general
conceptual scheme, which could serve as a methodological frame
for those very sciences. The interaction of consciousness-related
sciences hence would be hierarchically organized, with lower-level
sciences providing the factual basis for the higher levels, while a
higher-level science supplying the methodological principles to
the levels below. SOC, being the topmost level of this hierarchical
structure, could be thought of as representing all of the hierarchy,
which may virtually include all the sciences known. In this sense,
it may well play the role of philosophy. However, the same hierarchy
could be unfolded with the focus on another object (say, the personality),
and then SOC would occupy its place on one of the lower levels of
the resulting hierarchical structure, considering only one aspect of
the object studied (e.g. the conscious level of the personality).
Interdisciplinary nature of any science is hence not absolute, depending
on the specific hierarchical structure considered.
In the view of the refoldability of the hierarchy of science described above,
one might find a few week points in Schouborg's presentation. Thus,
the presence of non-science intrusions ("dialectical embrace" with
philosophy, syncretic "e-claims" and ideological "n-claims") which
is said to be a characteristic feature of SOC is actually a common
situation with all the sciences, which are all culturally conditioned,
combining all the variety of social phenomena, from shear
making money or entertainment to political intricacies, moral
obligations or sublime creativity [2]. Also, such things as concentration,
mindfulness and wisdom are indispensable in every science, rather
than being the skills of any particular specialty. Reflectivity is
common for all the sciences, as well as for the arts and philosophy
though the forms of reflection would differ, of course.
The specificity of SOC among the other sciences is not clear from
the paper reviewed, much due to the intentional focus on the
epistemology with no recourse to ontology of consciousness.
However, one cannot distinguish one science from another
knowing nothing about the objects they study; all what is left
is the most general methodology of science, which is the same
for all the scientific specialties. Virtually, any science is defined by
its object, and, leaving the object off, one would characterize it as
a science, but no more than that.
Another side of the lack of specificity is the absence of a clear
understanding of the internal organization of SOC. The map of
major methodologies suggested {22} is rather loose and eclectic,
and no objective necessity is felt behind it: just an empirical
enumeration, with no interrelationships being traced (though
claimed to be outlined). In a methodological work, one might
expect a more logical structure, where the hierarchy of components
would follow from a fundamental idea governing the whole study.
Despite of all these drawbacks, the article is most interesting since
it is based on an ideology not very common in the scientific
community of today. The keywords are: materialism, dialectics
and activity.
Materialism
The idea that every human experience must originate from some
external object existing in a way relatively independent of any
experiencing may seem quite appealing in many sciences, but
very few people have ever been aware of its deeper consequences.
Being materialistic is especially difficult in the sciences whose
inquiry would have to penetrate into the realm of subjectivity.
Is it possible to study the intimate 1st-person experiences in an
objective way? Can there be any methods of study other than
mere introspection? How do subjective experiences differ
from the effect of environment on a physical body, or the
sensations of the animals? These and other questions have to
be consistently answered in any science pretending to study
consciousness as an actually existing phenomenon.
Most existing treatments of the problem fail to describe consciousness
in a consistently materialistic way. They either admit the existence
of something beyond any scientific description, or simply deny
the reality of subjectivity, reducing conscious behavior to purely
physiological processes. Materialism gets often associated with
reductionism, assuming that consciousness is a product of the
brain and is located within the individual's body. But the specificity
of subjectivity escapes clear expression in terms of individual
experience, and the best one could do within this "biofunctional"
paradigm is to suggest a many-level description, with the lower
levels providing one of the possible implementations for the
higher-level functions that are qualitatively different from any
specific implementation. Then the hierarchy of the subject can be
phenomenologically described in any detail but one can never
tell why one hierarchical structure is more preferable than another,
and where the whole hierarchy comes from. As a result, the study
would either momentarily fall into idealism, like in [3], or postpone
the solution of the problem in a kind of "dual-aspect monism" or
"cybernetic realism" [4].
Gary Schouborg seems to advocate a dedicatedly materialistic
view on subjectivity and consciousness. He makes a smart notice
that "there has been found no one who denies an independently
existing world who has actually based their action and thinking on
the dictates of that denial." {40} Everything that is in consciousness
is in reality first, and the necessary link between the objectively
existing world and the content of consciousness is called experiencing.
This principle gets consistently applied to consciousness itself, so that
it is meant to exist as an objective attribute of the subject and one has
to experience it to become aware of it and subject to scientific analysis.
This logically leads to considering reflection as one of the most
important means of scientific inquiry, and all the other aspects of
science (and SOC in particular) become hierarchical, including both
immediate and reflective levels. Reflectivity is the key to the solution
of the ontological problems of consciousness, since it is closely related
to development [5]. However, Schouborg didn't further follow this line
of thought in the article reviewed, maybe intending to do it elsewhere.
Dialectics
The history of science knew many examples when originally materialistic
ideas could not be unfolded into a well-founded methodology and finally
got stuck in the static metaphysics, ignoring development and reflectivity.
The traditional logic failed to reconcile itself with ever changing objects
that might represent other objects too. The enhanced kind of materialism
accounting for reflection requires a different logic, which is known as
dialectics. It must be noted that both materialism without dialectics and
dialectics without materialism meet the same difficulties in describing
the developing world and its representation in the subject and the only
solution is to employ dialectical materialism and materialistic dialectics [6].
The paper reviewed suggests an interesting dialectical model {40}
that could be correlated with the general laws of dialectics [6]. The usage
of the word "consciousness" in this context indicates that Schouborg has
come very close to the understanding of consciousness as a collective
phenomenon never restricted to a single individual and existing only
in the society. This ontological claim is the key to the whole Science of
Consciousness, and its specific methodology.
The call for "pragmatically rational (not rationalistic) inquiry" {41}
is strongly opposing the positivist tradition of the modern science,
when the truth is thought to be achievable entirely within science,
and verifiable (or falsified) by the logical means. The necessity of
including practice in that process is rarely recognized and expressed
with Schouborg's clarity. Unfortunately, the brevity of the text
didn't permit the author to indicate that "unavoidably subjective
judgment" that is claimed to be "the final judge of truth" {41}
assumes a kind of objectivity, being related to the fundamental laws
of social development.
Activity
The active nature of scientific inquiry extensively advocated by
Schouborg is, from the viewpoint of dialectical materialism, the
necessary complement to the passive cognition, implicit in most
objectivist philosophies of science. The traditional assumption
that the object gets somehow represented in the subject's knowledge
ignores the development of both the object and knowledge about
it, and the active transformation of reality by the conscious
subject. But the task of science is not merely the explanation of
the world, but also the indication of the ways of its improvement.
While the animal adapts itself to the environment, the subject
adapts the environment to suit their needs this is the drastic
distinction of conscious behavior from the lower (organic or
physical) levels. Any serious study of consciousness must account
for this characteristic feature.
I will not quote the excellent observations of Schouborg on the
active formation of knowledge in the scientific research they
deserve to be read in the original. It must be noted, however,
that his idea of "immediate" experience {5} should be taken
with care, since the reflective nature of experiencing may
easily lead one to higher-level (mediated) experiences, so that
any "immediateness" becomes relative, and any experience
can be unfold into a hierarchy of "hidden" mediations, which
are nothing else but lower-level activities [7-9]. This minor
inaccuracy of Schouborg's approach is related to the insufficient
understanding that any 1st-person experience is just an
interiorized 3rd-person experience, and any individual thought
could be considered a dialog with oneself. The very subjectivity
(and consciousness) is the result of this converting the social
development into the "internal life" of the self [1, 10].
Of course, this brief account does not describe all the findings
of Gary Schouborg's article. I would just mention the analysis
of the relations between various kinds of "claims" and their
relation to experiencing and conceptualization, which could be
neatly fit in the general scheme of [11]. The relations between
SOC and TOC, together with the general methodological map
of {22}, could be correlated with the organization of science
as described in [12]. Also, there are many more interesting
parallels, of which enumeration would lead me to a paper much
longer than the one reviewed. Commenting the writings of the
others is easier than plain expressing one's own attitudes
and I can appreciate Gary Schouborg's attempt to formulate
the methodology "that a critical mass of consciousness scientists
will use it to move their inquiries forward rather than endlessly
debate fundamentals." {3} Though, in view of L.Vygotsky's
thoughts quoted in the first paragraph of this comment,
fundamentals have to be debated as long as the problem exists,
it is very important to accentuate the basic lines before the
actual study begins, to avoid blind wandering and dead ends.
References
1. L.Vygotsky
"The history of the development of the higher psychic functions."
Collected works, vol.3, pp.5-328 (Moscow: Pedagogika, 1983)
2. I refer to my own experience of a physicist, as well to my
observations about some other natural sciences and humanities.
3. L.M.Vecker
Psychic processes, vol. 3 (Moscow: Leningrad Univ., 1981)
4. G.R.Mulhauser
Mind out of matter (forthcoming in 1997, private communication)
5. P.B.Ivanov
Reflection: The ways of development (Moscow: Moscow State Conservatory, 1984)
6. E.V.Ilyenkov
Dialectical logic (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984)
7. A.N.Leontiev
Activity, Consciousness and Personality (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978)
8. P.B.Ivanov
"A hierarchical theory of aesthetic perception: Musical scales."
Leonardo, vol. 27, no.5, pp.417-421 (1994)
9. P.B.Ivanov
"A hierarchical theory of aesthetic perception: Scales in the visual arts."
Leonardo Music Journal, vol.5, pp. 49-55 (1995)
10. L.Vygotsky
Thought and language (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986)
11. http://unism.pjwb.org/phi/lse.htm
12. P.B.Ivanov
Dialectics of hierarchies (Troisk, Russia: Inst. Spectrosc. Acad. Sci. USSR, 1983)
|