Commentary 21 on
Karl Jaspers Forum, Target Article 15, 19 January 1999
HOW DO PHYSICISTS BUILD REALITY?
By Herbert F J Muller
WE CANNOT ARGUE IF WE DON'T EXIST
by Paul Jones
4 March 1999
Abstract
One cannot argue with a solipsist, since one's arguments
can never be treated as something real by a person who
doubts the existence of any reality at all. Commenting such
views can only be of some use for materialists talking
between themselves.
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Notation:
{ } paragraphs of the source text
Muller's response to my and Nunn's comments is an illustrative
example of how void may be argument addressed to a person
of a different ideological stand. In dialectical materialism,
this is a natural consequence of the secondary nature of
people's thoughts and the primariness of matter: indeed,
it is only practice that can influence people's views,
and never the arguments. Words can be used to support
communication between persons with similar pictures of the world
(that is, involved in similar activities), and they can tell
nothing to those who do not want to understand. That is why
I never intend to convert idealists into materialists, and
all I write is mainly to serve as an anchor for other people
who acknowledge my existence and do not doubt that there is
something in the world to talk about. Since if there is
nothing at all there is nothing to discuss.
Here, I am speaking to materialists, and my topic is an
idealist's incapability of comprehending any argument
save their own at least until they make a concession to
materialism.
1.
Misunderstanding is striking from the very beginning
(in the abstract of Muller's R3):
{abstract} "Paul Jones proposes that science, including that
dealing with consciousness, has to be based on the principle
of the primacy of matter, and that mind is secondary to matter"...
"I suggest that this is not possible, because all knowledge, both
about matter and about other areas, can only take place within
subjective experience ('mind', 'consciousness') which is the
only entrance to reality."
The latter does not contradict to the former, since consciousness
is only one of the aspects of the same reality, being "implemented"
in (the social form of) matter. On the other hand, there is again
the same inconsistency: one cannot speak about the mind as an
"entrance to reality" without reality existing outside (and
independently of) the mind.
{4} "I say that all mental structures are built inside originally
undivided mind-nature experience."..."This opinion is supported
by the observation that no mental structures arise outside experience."
For a materialist, this is trivial: human ideas are produced
by humans, and not "ready-made". However, this does not mean
that there is nothing but human ideas, and one should overestimate
primitive (syncretic) thought.
{abstract} "The mind-brain relation is the mind-matter relation
of Descartes because brain is matter"
The primitive ideas of Descartes can hardly account for the
complexity of the problem. There is no mind-brain relation,
and one can never treat consciousness in that way. It is
on the social level of matter only that consciousness can be
explained.
{abstract} "Traditional metaphysicists (materialists as well as
others) want to discover a pre-constructed reality"
It is vulgar (metaphysical) materialists only that can speak of any
"pre-constructed" reality. Matter has not been "constructed" by
anybody, and it develops, never remaining the same. A part of this
development is associated with conscious activity.
2.
{2} "'Materialism' (which implies belief in mind-independent
reality, MIR) is Jones' world view."
Materialism is not a belief, it is an ideological position.
Idealists can be satisfied with beliefs. Materialists have
to participate in the practice.
{2} "Vulgar materialism seems to be more or less what others
call naive realism"
Not at all. The distinction between the natural-science
and metaphysical materialism has already been drawn in paragraph {1}
of my comment C4 on TA15.
{2} "In response to an earlier communication from Jones,
I have discussed (in TA1 R2) dialectical materialism,
which he advocates"
That was a discussion of the common prejudice about dialectical
materialism, rather than dialectical materialism itself.
In January, I submitted a target article
to KJF, concerning the
difference between vulgar (metaphysical) and dialectical materialism,
as well as their relation to idealism. It is a pity that
it has not been distributed on the Forum before Muller's R3.
I must also stress that, personally, I am not an advocate of
dialectical materialism, since my views are much wider,
though including dialectical materialism as one of the
cornerstones.
3.
The typical trick of an idealist who is too shy to admit being
an idealist is term substitution.
{3} "Secondly, both he and Nunn write that I am an 'idealist',
which baffles me"...
"My opinion, in contrast, is that: all ideas"..."are constructed
inside experience, and thus secondary to it."
One can replace the word "idea" with the word "experience", but
this will change nothing in the sense of the text. The point is
whether one agrees that there is something beyond human thoughts,
which determines them, this is materialism, or there is
nothing but thoughts ("experiences") this is idealism.
More examples:
{6} "Other people or the world in general are not 'my phantasies',
but they are part of constructed reality"
Constructed by whom?!! Surely, if I am your mental construction,
you do not need to take me for serious, Mr.Muller!
{7} "Structuring reality does not mean inventing or imagining
or hallucinating it, as Jones appears to assume"
Fine! First, you "build" reality as you please; then you
"structure" this ephemeral construction and call that science!
Like in the well-known gag: "It's nineties, baby, and there ain't no such thing as paranoia it's all real now."
4.
In any argument, one has to omit much of what is implied,
just to save space. However, such defaults may be misused:
{5} "The prevalence of materialism does not prove that
it works; it fails in the study of mind-brain relationships
('consciousness'), and needs replacement by a more helpful
view."
Who said that materialism failed in studying consciousness?
In fact, the only knowledge we have came from quite materialistic
research, and never from solipsist mediation. Can idealism
be called a "more helpful view" if it denies the very
possibility of knowing anything?
Once again, the relationship between the body and the mind
has little to do with the problem of consciousness.
5.
An example of the direct rejection of the other's position:
{5} "Physicists build reality like everyone else, by thinking,
not by 'leaving material traces'"
One can never build anything by thinking. Let Muller try
to do that at least once and show me the product. Let him
tell the millions of homeless people that they can have
roof over their heads by mere thinking about it! Let him
tell the millions of suffering from hunger that they can
be satiated by mere thought of bread! Even in science,
let me know about at least one scientist who became scientist
without being involved in the cultural process called science,
by mere thinking of being a scientist...
6.
Both idealists and vulgar materialists get baffled by the
existence of abstract ideas, up to the degree of claiming
such ideas unrelated to anything at all:
{5} "Jones says that there is no idea that would not refer
to matter: how does this apply to numbers ?"
Numbers are an example of entirely matter-dependent
abstraction. They do not exist outside a certain way of
action, namely, counting (or, more generally, measurement).
One can distinguish various kinds of numbers according to
the operations admissible within the corresponding class;
these operations refer to a specific area of human
activity, which can only exist under certain economic
and social conditions. It is poor understanding of this
circumstance that causes many void debates about the
"true" theory of numbers, or "incompleteness" of existing
theories. Any theory is applicable within its own range of
activities, and every theory is incomplete, since it cannot
be applied to any activity at all.
7.
My attempts to extract rational grains from any position,
however erroneous, should not be interpreted as a
concession to idealism.
{9} "Jones wants to translate my formulations into a
materialistic view"
In my C08, I only demonstrate that,
even within idealism, there
may be bright spots reflecting the realities of the world,
social realities included. No thought should be neglected,
since there can be no thought without material grounds
for it.
{9} "He distinguishes 'objective' and 'productive' aspects of
subjectivity: 'all one knows has already been 'adapted' to the
human ways', and 'for singular things, their objective integrity
can only be limited'. This I guess is as close as Jones comes to
acknowledging that the mind builds reality."
Mind can never build reality. It is people who do that,
and they have to do that in matter, not in their thoughts.
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